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Abstract 
Introduction: Research suggests safety climate (SC) is a strong predictor of safety-
related outcomes in organizations. This study explores the relationship between six SC 
dimensions and four aspects of work-related driving. Method: The SC factors measured 
were ‘communication and procedures’, ‘work pressures’, ‘relationships’, ‘safety rules’, 
‘driver training’, and ‘management commitment’.  The aspects of self-reported 
occupational driving measured were traffic violations, driver error, driving while 
distracted, and pre-trip vehicle maintenance. Results: Hierarchical regression analyses 
revealed the SC factors accounted for significant amounts of variance in all four aspects 
of work-related driving, over and above the control factors of age, sex, and work-related 
driving exposure.  However, further investigation indicated certain SC factors 
(particularly safety rules, communication, and management commitment) were more 
strongly related to specific aspects of work-related driving behavior than others. 
Together, the SC factors were best able to predict self-reported distraction from the road 
than the other aspects of driving behavior measured. Implications for occupational 
safety, particularly for the management of work-related drivers are discussed. 
 
Keywords: Safety climate; safety culture; work-related driving; organizational 
influences; occupational safety 
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1. Introduction 
Work-related traffic crashes are the largest single cause of occupational fatalities 
in Australia (Haworth, 2002). These crashes account for approximately 25% of all 
occupational fatalities each year (Harrison, Mandryk, & Frommer, 1993; National 
Occupational Health and Safety Commission [NOHSC], 1998), and are twice as likely 
to result in death or permanent disablement as any other occupational incidents 
(Wheatley, 1997).   
The scope of the problem of work-related crashes has also been recognized as a 
major public health and safety issue in many other countries including the United 
States, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Sweden (e.g., Bibbings, 1997; Bylund, 
Björnstig, & Larsson, 1997; Driscoll et al., 2005; Gregersen, Brehmer, & Moren, 1996).  
In recent years, work-related driving has received increased focus and recognition as an 
issue with occupational health and safety implications (Haworth, Tingvall, & Kowadlo, 
2000; Murray, Newnam, Watson, Davey, & Schonfeld, 2002).   
 
1.1 Safety Climate 
Over the past two decades, research and discussion in occupational safety 
sciences has focused on the importance of management practices and their impact on 
employees’ occupational safety behaviors and other organizational safety outcomes 
such as injuries, fatalities, and other incidents. A key aspect of this has been the 
increasing interest in the concept of organizational safety climate (SC). While thus far, 
researchers have not provided one definitive description, there appears to be increasing 
consensus about the nature of the concept.  
This literature suggests SC represents employees’ perceptions about 
organizational support, and particularly, management’s commitment to safety in the 
organization. The most problematic inconsistency in the literature concerns the 
theoretical distinction between safety climate and safety culture, an issue which has, at 
times, also been evident in the literature on organizational culture and climate more 
generally (Denison, 1996). While a comprehensive discussion of this problem is beyond 
the intent of this paper, it is important to note distinctions are often recognized, both in 
terms of the underlying theory and methodology used.   
As the terms are used throughout this study, ‘safety climate’ (SC) refers to 
workers’ perceptions – a psychological concept (as described above), while the broader 
and more complex notion of ‘safety culture’ refers to a phenomenon which manifests at 
various levels including behaviorally, psychologically and socially, through channels 
such as values, attitudes, beliefs, and normative behaviors (Glendon & Stanton, 2000; 
International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], 1991; Schein, 1990; Waring & Glendon, 
1998).    
Investigation into SC has primarily focused on the relationship between 
workers’ perceptions of organizational and management practices, and various 
organizational safety outcomes, including: company incident rates (Diaz & Cabrera, 
1997; Varonen & Mattila, 2000); self-reported occupational incident involvement 
frequency (Mearns, Flin, Gordon, & Fleming, 1998; Mearns, Whitaker, & Flin, 2003); 
self-reported occupational injury frequency and severity (Gillen, Baltz, Gassel, Kirsch, 
& Vaccaro, 2002; Vredenburgh, 2002); safety performance and behavior (Griffin & 
Neal, 2000; Wills, Watson, & Biggs, 2004); and the frequency of worker’s 
compensation claims (O'Toole, 2002).  
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Gillen et al. (2002) also found SC differed between union and non-union 
construction workers, reflecting  the different worksite safety requirements of these 
affiliations. Additionally, O’Toole (2002) demonstrated employees’ SC scores changed 
with the implementation of organizational safety interventions.  Recent research on SC 
has also started to investigate group-level climate influences on occupational safety 
(e.g., Cheyne, Tomás, Cox, & Oliver, 2003; Zohar, 2000; Zohar & Luria, 2005) as well 
as the determinants of SC (DeJoy, Schaffer, Wilson, Vandenberg, & Butts, 2004).  
      Factor analytic studies have demonstrated SC measures typically contain 
underlying factor structures of comparable nature. For example, Flin, Mearns, 
O'Connor, and Bryden (2000) reviewed the dimensions underlying 18 SC survey 
measures and found several recurrent factors, including: management behaviors and 
attitudes; safety management systems such as policies and procedures; risks; work 
pressures; and competency. Evidence also suggests that perceptions concerning 
management commitment to safety may be another stable element of SC (Cox & Flin, 
1998; Oliver, Cheyne, Tomás , & Cox, 2002; O'Toole, 2002; Zohar, 1980).   
While some studies have shown inconsistent factor structures when measures 
are re-examined with samples from different organizations and industries (e.g., Brown 
& Holmes, 1986; Niskanen, 1994; Zohar, 1980), others have shown relatively consistent 
factor structure patterns (e.g., Glendon & Litherland, 2001; Glendon, Stanton, & 
Harrison, 1994; Wills, Biggs, & Watson, 2005).  The literature has provided much 
discussion (and recommendations) about which aspects of organizational safety 
management and practice should be included in SC measures.   
 
 
1.2 Study Aims 
Paradoxically, although research appears to confirm the multi-dimensionality of 
SC in organizations, many studies have treated the concept as a global indicator of the 
overall shared climate held by employees within a particular organization or group.  To 
date, there is limited evidence regarding the relative influence, and hence importance, of 
the various SC dimensions and their relationship to occupational safety behaviors. This 
study will begin to address this limitation by comparing the relative relationship 
between SC factors and various safety-related occupational behaviors.  Therefore, self-
reported work-related driving behaviors were the dependent variables of interest to this 
study, and SC factors represented the independent variables.   
 
2. Method 
 
2.1 Participants 
A total of 1000 workers were approached to participate in the study across three 
organizations based in the State of Queensland, Australia.  The organizations were a 
local government council, a state government transport agency, and a private industrial 
resource provider. A total of 329 workers agreed to participate in the study – 
representing an overall response rate of 32.9%. Six participants were removed from the 
sample prior to data analysis due to incomplete data.  The final sample consisted of 323 
employees.  To be eligible to participate in the study, the respondents needed to drive a 
motor vehicle at least once during the course of their average working week.  The 
sample consisted of 93.5% male workers and 6.5% females.  Although there were few 
female participants, this gender distribution reflected the nature of the industries and 
  Safety climate and work-related driving  5 
organizations involved.  The majority of participants were aged between 40 - 49 years 
(43%), 50 - 59 years (23%), or 30 -39 years (22%).  
2.2 Procedure 
Workers were contacted through the internal mail systems of their respective 
organizations and asked to participate in a voluntary research study. They received an 
information sheet detailing: the anonymous nature of the study and a letter confirming 
management support for their participation; instructions for completing and returning 
the survey; and the survey. Two weeks following distribution of surveys each 
organization was requested to send reminders about participation in the study via email 
or other internal communications processes. To maintain participant anonymity and 
confidentiality and to maximize the response rate, surveys were returned directly to the 
researchers in prepaid envelopes.  
 
2.3 Measures 
2.3.1 Safety climate.  A modified version of Glendon and Litherland’s (2001) 
Safety Climate Questionnaire (SCQ) was used.  A description of this questionnaire 
(Safety Climate Questionnaire – Modified for Drivers [SCQ-MD]) including 
development, factor structure, and reliability statistics is fully described in Wills et al. 
(2005). The SCQ-MD contained items from the original SCQ which were modified to 
increase applicability to the context of work-related vehicle driving, and included 35 
items (five-point Likert scale ranging from ‘Never / Not at all’ to ‘Always’) 
representing six SC factors, relating to ‘communication’, ‘work pressures’, 
‘relationships’, ‘driver training’, ‘management commitment’, and ‘safety rules’.  All 
factors were calculated such that higher scores indicated safer perceptions.  Regarding 
the ‘work pressures’ factor, it is important to note that a high score on this factor is 
indicative of a safer perception, indicating that the participant perceived a high level of 
support from the organization and thus less pressure.     
 
2.3.2 Driver behavior.  A modified version of the Driver Behavior 
Questionnaire (DBQ) (Lawton, Parker, Manstead, & Stradling, 1997) was used to 
measure driver behavior.  The modifications were designed such that there was an 
increased focus on work-related driving; that is, driving during the course of work.  
Additional behavior items included were: two items pertaining to reversing behavior 
while driving for work, five items relating to on-road distraction while driving for work, 
and two items relating to pre-trip maintenance behaviors.  The inclusion of these items 
was based on previous research on work-related driving (Newnam, Watson, & Murray, 
2002; Salminen & Lahdeniemi, 2002), as well as discussions with staff involved in the 
day-to-day management of fleets.  Items were measured using a six-point Likert scale 
ranging from ‘Never’ to ‘Nearly all the time’.  New items included in the current study 
are denoted in Table 1.  Appropriate calculations were performed such that higher 
scores on any item indicated safer behavior.  The factor structure of the modified DBQ 
applied in this study is shown in the following results section.     
 
3. Results 
 
3.1 Factor Analysis of the Modified DBQ 
Exploratory factor analyses were performed on the data collected from all 323 
cases on the 29 behavior items included in the modified DBQ.  The case-to-variable 
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ratio (10:1) exceeded that recommended by Hair, Anderson, Tatham, and Black (1998).  
A Principal Axis Factor Analysis with varimax rotation revealed eight factors exceeding 
Kaiser’s criterion of eigenvalues > 1.  Cattell’s scree test strongly supported a four-
factor extraction, accounting for 35.6% of the total variance.  However, as examination 
of the factor transformation matrix indicated several factors were strongly correlated (> 
.5), a second Principal Axis Factor Analysis with an oblimin rotation was performed 
and the same criteria for factor extraction followed.  Four factors were extracted, 
explaining 35.5% of the total variance.  The resulting factor loadings of greater than .30 
are shown in bold-type in Table 1.  As shown in Table 1, reliability coefficients for each 
of the factors was above the acceptable cut-off level of .70 (De Vaus, 2002).  It is 
important to note that items 11, 12, 19, and 29 were excluded from further analyses due 
to unsatisfactory factor loadings (< .30).   
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
3.2 Correlations and Hierarchical Regressions 
Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated for the SC factors, the four 
aspects of driver behavior, overall driver behavior, and key socio-demographic variables 
and are shown in Table 2.  The correlations between the SC factors ranged from 
moderate to strong (r = .19 to .70).  A hierarchical regression was conducted to examine 
the combined capacity of the SC factors to predict overall work-related driver behavior 
(each of the four aspects combined).  Subsequently, four follow-up hierarchical 
regression analyses were conducted to examine the combined capacity of the SC factors 
to predict each of the aspects of work-related driving.  In each of these five analyses, 
employee age and sex were entered as demographic control variables at step 1, along 
with the average hours driven each week for work as a measure of driving exposure.  
The SC factors were entered as step 2 of the hierarchical regression analyses to examine 
their ability to predict work-related driving behavior over and above the control factors. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
3.2.1 Overall work-related driver behavior (combined).  All of the SC factors 
were significantly correlated with overall work-related driving behavior (as shown in 
Table 2).  ‘Safety rules’ had the strongest correlation, followed by ‘communication and 
procedures’, ‘management commitment’, and ‘work pressures’ (r  ≥ .30).   
Hierarchical regression analysis revealed that together the model accounted for 
25% of the variance in overall work-related driver behavior, F (9, 306) = 11.30, p < 
.001.  The six SC factors accounted for 19% of the variance in driver distraction, over 
and above the control factors, ΔF = (6, 306) = 13.12, p < .001.  Inspection of the Beta 
(β) coefficients (see Table 3) showed that ‘safety rules’ made a significant contribution 
to the overall regression model, uniquely accounting for 4% of the variance in overall 
work-related driver behavior.  
      
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
3.2.2 Driver distraction.  All SC factors were significantly correlated with driver 
distraction.  There was a moderate correlation between ‘work pressures’ and driver 
distraction.   ‘Safety rules’ and ‘management commitment’ were moderately correlated 
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with driver distraction, while ‘relationships’ and ‘communication and procedures’ 
displayed correlations of  r  < .30 with driver distraction (see Table 2).  
Hierarchical regression analysis revealed that together the model accounted for 
24% of the variance in self-reported driver distraction, F (9, 306) = 10.67, p < .001.  
The six SC factors accounted for 20% of the variance in driver distraction, over and 
above the control factors, ΔF = (6, 306) = 13.12, p < .001.  Inspection of the Beta (β) 
coefficients (see Table 4) showed that ‘work pressures’ contributed significantly to the 
overall regression model, uniquely accounting for 6% of the variance. ‘Safety rules’ and 
‘management commitment’ were also significant, uniquely accounting for 2% and 1% 
of the variance in self-reported driver distraction respectively.  
 
3.2.3 Traffic violations.  All SC factors were significantly correlated with self-
reported traffic violations.  As shown in Table 2, the ‘safety rules’ factor was 
moderately correlated with reported traffic violations, while ‘communications and 
procedures’, ‘management commitment’, ‘work pressures’, and ‘relationships’ 
correlated with traffic violations at r < .30.    
A third hierarchical regression revealed the overall model accounted for 20% of 
the variance in traffic violations, F (9, 306) = 8.38, p < .001.  The six SC factors 
accounted for 13% of the variance in driver distraction, over and above the control 
factors, ΔF = (6, 306) = 8.15, p < .001.  Inspection of the Beta (β) coefficients (see 
Table 5) showed that ‘safety rules’ contributed significantly to the overall regression 
model, uniquely accounting for 4% of the variance in reported traffic violations.  
 
3.2.4 Driver error.  All SC factors correlated significantly with driver error, 
although only ‘management commitment’ and ‘safety rules’ displayed weak-moderate 
correlations, while ‘communication and procedures’ was correlated at r = .20 (see Table 
2).   
Hierarchical regression revealed the overall model accounted for 11% of the 
variance in reported driver error, F (9, 306) = 4.24, p < .001 (see Table 5).  The six SC 
factors accounted for 10% of the variance in driver distraction, over and above the 
control factors, ΔF = (6, 306) = 5.91, p < .001.  Inspection of the Beta (β) coefficients 
(see Table 6) showed that ‘management commitment’ and ‘safety rules’ each made a 
significant contribution to the overall regression model, uniquely accounting for 3% and 
2% of the variance in driver error, respectively.  
 
3.2.5 Pre-trip vehicle maintenance.  Finally, all SC factors correlated 
significantly with drivers’ pre-trip maintenance behaviors.  However, only 
‘communication and procedures’ displayed a correlation of r > .20 (see Table 2). 
The final hierarchical regression revealed the overall model accounted for 16% 
of the variance in driver error, F (9, 306) = 6.28, p < .001.  The six SC factors accounted 
for 6% of the variance in driver distraction, over and above the control factors, ΔF = (6, 
306) = 3.35, p < .001.  Inspection of the Beta (β) coefficients (see Table 7) showed that 
‘communication and procedures’ was the only SC factor to make a significant 
contribution to the overall regression model, uniquely accounting for 3% of the variance 
in driver error.  Interestingly, driving exposure (average hours per week spent driving) 
also significantly contributed to the overall model uniquely accounting for 7% of the 
variance in pre-trip vehicle maintenance.   
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[Insert Table 4 here] 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
3.3 Summary of Results 
To investigate the proposed relationship between SC and occupational driver 
safety, correlations between the six SC factors and the four aspects of work-related 
driving were examined using combined data from all three organizations and further 
investigated with hierarchical regression analyses.  Hierarchical regression revealed that 
together the SC factors were significant predictors of overall work-related driving 
behavior (over and above the control factors age, sex, and work-related driving 
exposure).  In summary, these data also suggest that the following climate perceptions 
are important predictors of occupational safety for work-related drivers: the importance 
and practicality of the organization’s safety rules; how issues relating to fleet and driver 
safety are communicated within and across the organization; and management’s 
commitment to fleet and driver safety (see Table 8 for a summary of significant SC 
factors).  Additionally, together the SC factors were best able to predict self-reported 
distraction from the road while driving (which included behaviors such as driving while 
tired or feeling time pressured) than the other aspects of work-related driving behavior 
included.      
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
4. Discussion 
Safety climate has been treated as a construct which can be used as a 
quantitative measure of employees’ global perceptions about how safety is managed and 
treated within their employing organization.  Researchers have linked SC perceptions to 
a number of occupational safety behaviors and outcomes.  While there may well be 
sufficient evidence to support treating SC as such a global or ‘molar’ construct, research 
has also provided evidence for its multi-dimensional nature (we have suggested 
elsewhere that further confirmatory and hierarchical factor analyses on SC measures are 
needed [see Wills et al., 2005]).   
The results of this study suggest (in the case of organizational fleets and work-
related driving) some dimensions of SC may be more strongly related to certain driving 
behaviors than others.  That is, regression analyses revealed certain aspects of SC (such 
as work pressures) were more salient predictors of certain behaviors (such as being 
distracted from the road) than others.  On the whole however, ‘safety rules’ was the 
only significant predictor of overall self-reported driver behavior (and traffic violations 
including such on-road behaviors as speeding and aggressive driving).  It is worth 
noting that while not all of the relationships presented in the results are statistically 
‘strong’, they are not insignificant. These results also suggest future SC research need 
also consider additional organizational and non-organizational influences on driver 
behavior.  
Nonetheless, the results indicate particular aspects of SC are more strongly 
related to certain aspects of work-related driver behavior than others. Therefore, 
organizations and researchers should explore which particular organizational and 
management practices should become the focus of change and development programs, 
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with the aim of having an impact upon the broader organizational safety culture and the 
workers’ safety behaviors.  For example, the results indicated if an intervention strategy 
were implemented to decrease distraction amongst drivers, work pressures may be an 
important factor to consider.   
The results also suggest the impact of safety policies and rules, and management 
commitment should be considered.  In this case, a multi-pronged approach may be 
beneficial, aiming to reduce those pressures which lead to stress and distraction from 
the road as well as introducing programs to enhance management commitment to 
ensuring driver safety receives an appropriate level of attention.   
A further example can be drawn from the results relating to drivers’ pre-trip 
maintenance behavior.  In this case, it may be useful to focus on the ‘communication’ 
dimension, as the results suggested organizational communication was the only factor 
that had a significant relationship with drivers’ self-reported vehicle maintenance 
behaviors (compared to the other SC factors studied).  Enhancing the lines and flow of 
formal and informal communication regarding the rules and expectations relating to 
vehicle maintenance should be beneficial.  Following the identification of such 
relationships, the literature and research on developing such programs should then be 
consulted for potential strategies.   
We suggest the results from an SC survey be used to activate further 
investigation.  Glendon and Stanton (2000) outlined the potential benefits of 
complementing SC survey research with other techniques such as qualitative interviews 
and observations.  Before designing intervention strategies we recommend drivers, 
supervisors, and other organizational stakeholders be interviewed so the researchers 
understand the applicable contextual issues more comprehensively.  Such extensive data 
collection processes will enhance the quality of the information collected about 
problematic behaviors and organizational practices.   
While the results of this study provide support for the use of a SC measure as a 
safety diagnosis tool for organizations and researchers, the investigation of such data 
should be the first stage in organizational safety diagnosis.  Subsequently, it is important 
to complement such investigation with more in-depth data collection techniques.  Such 
further data collection and exploration should also help to guide researchers and 
managers in identifying other (organizational and non-organizational) factors which 
impact work-related driver safety. 
As SC is often conceptualized as a psychological manifestation of behavioral 
and cultural artifacts within an organization, these findings have strong practical 
applicability for the management of work-related driver safety and the prediction of 
work-related road safety, including related employee health outcomes in fleet settings.  
In terms of practical implications, it remains important that day-to-day operations be 
managed in a way that reduces psychological pressures and strains upon drivers.  This 
should be achieved through the proper implementation of relevant safety policies and 
procedures.   
These findings suggest an essential part of implementing such strategies may be 
to ensure rules and procedures are perceived as practical and important by employees, 
and they do not conflict with the requirements of other work tasks.  The safety rules 
items used in this study have a particular focus on the perceived practicality and 
importance of those rules (see Wills et al., [2005] for a description of the items included 
in each SC factor).  Findings relating to the importance of management commitment to 
driver safety support and extend this point.  To assist the transfer of policy 
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implementation to safer employee driving behavior, organizations should openly 
demonstrate they are committed to the issue, thus taking steps towards convincing 
employees that safe driving is an accepted and expected part of their role within the 
organization.         
5. Limitations 
The data analyzed in this study were collected using self-report methods, and are 
subject to the limitations inherent through using that methodology such as memory and 
denial biases and related influences on recall.  While some efforts were made to limit 
the potential for socially desirable responses (such as emphasizing the confidential and 
voluntary nature of the research), such potentially confounding factors were not 
statistically controlled.  Similarly, it is important to consider the possible impact of 
consistency and self-selection principles on the results. For example, it is possible some 
participants made a link between factors such as work pressure and driver distraction 
when responding on the questionnaire measures.  Future research should explore more 
extensive methodologies to counter such potentially confounding effects.   
The sample was predominantly male.  Although this did reflect the organizations 
and the general nature of the industries involved (three industrial organizations 
operating in the state of Queensland, Australia), care needs to be taken when 
generalizing the results and findings to other organizations and cultural contexts. 
Further research needs to confirm the present findings with larger and more diverse 
samples of work-related drivers.     
One limitation regarding the driver safety training dimension (as it was 
operationalized in this study) is that the items focused on the perceived quality and 
relevance of any driver training received.  Thus, a low score on this dimension may 
indicate employees had simply not received any driver training at all.  Anecdotal 
evidence from an open-ended section of the questionnaire provided some support for 
this interpretation.  As this is a difficult issue to control in multiple-organization 
research, future studies could address this by: 1) devising items that are 
organization/contextually specific; or 2) for the purpose of comparing organizations, 
remove the training dimension and simply determine whether or not training had been 
offered to employees at all.    
To maintain the ecological validity of the questionnaire used, a number of items 
were modified to enhance their applicability to the context and behaviors of interest – 
work-related driving/road-user safety.  Efforts were made to limit such changes to only 
necessary items (such as items pertaining to policies).  Although this is an inherent 
problem in research involving multiple organizations, it is important to consider this 
limitation when extending these findings and recommendations to other industrial and 
behavioral contexts and settings.   
 
6. Conclusions and Future Directions 
This study is an initial exploratory step in a program of research which aims to 
examine the nature and antecedents of work-related driver safety.  In terms of managing 
employees’ on-road behavior and the related outcomes, overall the findings suggest 
policies relating to driver and vehicle safety may play an important role in influencing 
the four behaviors examined.  However, this study also found the SC factors included 
had a stronger relationship with driver distraction than violations, errors, or vehicle 
maintenance behaviors.  This suggests there may be other work-related or person-
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related factors (not included in this study) which may be more strongly linked to these 
other behaviors.   
It is also important to consider some of the methodological limitations inherent 
to self-report data collection which may have influenced the results.  Future SC research 
should explore counter methodologies, such as incorporating more sophisticated 
triangulated data collection techniques.  Further research is therefore needed to compare 
the relationship between SC and work-related driver safety, with consideration for, and 
relative to other influencing factors.   
In conclusion, these findings support the expected benefits of adopting a multi-
dimensional approach to driver safety management in organizations, and occupational 
health and safety management more broadly.  Future research may enhance the depth 
and richness of knowledge regarding the interaction between organizational SC factors, 
behavior and other safety outcomes, by placing the constructs within a more 
comprehensive conceptual and theory-based model.   
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Table 1 
Pattern matrix for modified DBQ with additional behavior items 
Label and items 1 2 3 4 
Factor 1 – Driver error     
1. Fail to notice that pedestrians are crossing when turning into a side street 
from a main road 
.67    
2. Miss ‘Stop’ or ‘Give Way’ signs and narrowly avoid colliding with traffic 
having right of way 
.60    
3. Hit something while reversing 1 .58    
4. Underestimate the speed of an oncoming vehicle when overtaking .57    
5. Queuing to turn left onto a main road, you pay such close attention to the 
mainstream of traffic that you nearly hit the car in front 
.51    
6. Come close to hitting something while reversing 1 .50    
7. Brake too quickly on a slippery road, or steer the wrong way in a skid .47    
8. Attempt to overtake someone that you hadn’t noticed to be signalling a 
right turn 
.47    
9. Fail to check your rear-view mirror before pulling out, changing lanes, etc .42    
10. On turning left nearly hit a cyclist who has come up on your inside .37    
11. Pull out of a junction so far that the driver with right of way has to stop and 
let you out 
.26    
12. Become angered by another driver and give chase with the intention of 
giving him/her a piece of your mind 
.26    
 
Factor 2 – Pre-trip vehicle maintenance behaviors 2 
    
13. Check the tyre pressure of your work vehicle  .97   
14. Check the oil and water levels of your work vehicle  .79   
 
Factor 3 – Driver distraction 3 
    
15. Drive while tired   -.68  
16. Drive while under time pressure   -.63  
17. Find yourself being distracted from the road by other thoughts .23  -.62  
18. Lose concentration .47  -.57  
19. Drive even though you suspect you may be over the legal blood-alcohol 
limit 
    
 
Factor 4 - Violations 
    
20. Disregard the speed limit on a highway/freeway   -.22 .63 
21. Drive especially close to the car in front as a signal to its driver to go faster 
or get out of the way 
   .62 
22. Race away from the traffic lights with the intention of beating the driver 
next to you 
   .51 
23. Become impatient with a slow driver in an outer lane and overtake on the 
inside 
   .48 
24. Become angered by a certain type of driver and indicate your hostility by 
whatever means you can 
.21   .46 
25. Disregard the speed limit on a residential road   -.27 .43 
26. Sound your horn to indicate your annoyance to another driver    .41 
27. Stay in a lane that you know will be closed ahead until the last minute 
before forcing your way into another lane 
   .37 
28. Cross a junction knowing that the traffic lights have already turned against 
you 
.27   .30 
29. Drive while using a hand held mobile phone 3   -.22 .26 
     
Percentage of variance explained (%) 22.1 5.6 4.6 3.3 
Alpha reliability coefficient .81 .87 .71 .77 
Note. Items with factors loadings shown in bold were included in analyses 
1 Additional study items relating to errors while reversing 
2 Additional study items relating to pre-trip vehicle maintenance behaviors 
3 Additional study items relating to distraction 
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Table 2  
Correlations among main variables 
 Driver 
behavior 
(combined) 
Driver 
distraction 
Traffic 
violations 
Driver 
error 
Pre-trip 
maintenance 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 
1.Age .17* .18* .23** -.05 .13* - -.22** .08 -.01 .02 -.07 -.09 .02 .02 
2.Sex 1 -.12* -.12* -.09 -.04 -.12*  - -.02 -.08 -.10 -.09 .04 -.08 -.01 
3.Hours driven per 
week 
.15* -.03 .15* .06 .29**   - .06 -.18* -.04 .18* -.02 .03 
4.Communication & 
procedures 
.35** .26** .29** .20** .25**    - .60** .61** .42** .70** .57** 
5.Work pressures .32** .41** .23** .19** .09*     - .55** .19** .49** .53** 
6.Relationships .28** .27** .23** .19** .11*      - .38** .49** .42** 
7.Driver training .21** .15* .16* .17* .11*       - .39** .21** 
8.Management 
commitment 
.35** .30** .25** .28** .15*        - .48** 
9.Safety rules .39** .33** .34** .25** .16*         - 
*p < .05 **p < .001 
1 1 = Male, 2 = Female 
  Safety climate and work-related driving  17 
Table 3 
Hierarchical regression analysis for overall work-related driver behavior (combined) 
*p < .05 **p < .01 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
B 
Std. error  
β 
sr2
(unique) 
 
R2 
 
Adj R2 
 
ΔR2 
Step 1 
Age 
 
.06* 
 
.02 
 
.15 
 
.03 
   
Sex -.10 .09 -.06     
Average hours driven (per week) 
 
.04* .01 .15 .03  
.06 
 
.05 
 
Step 2 
Communication 
 
-.01 
 
.05 
 
-.02 
    
Work pressures .07 .04 .12     
Relationships  .03 .03 .06     
Driver training .02 .02 .06     
Management commitment .07 .04 .14     
Safety rules .15** .04 .22 .04  
.25 
 
.23 
 
.19 
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Table 4  
Hierarchical regression analysis for driver distraction 
*p < .05 **p < .001 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
B 
Std. error  
β 
sr2
(unique) 
 
R2 
 
Adj R2 
 
ΔR2 
Step 1 
Age 
 
.12 
 
.04 
 
.17 
    
Sex -.16 .15 -.06     
Average hours driven (per week) .00 .02 .01   
.04 
 
.03 
 
 
Step 2 
Communication 
 
-.20 
 
.09 
 
-.18 
    
Work pressures .30** .07 .32 .06    
Relationships  .05 .06 .06     
Driver training .04 .03 .08     
Management commitment .11* .06 .13 .01    
Safety rules .19* .07 .16 .02  
.24 
 
.22 
 
.20 
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Table 5  
Hierarchical regression analysis for traffic violations 
*p < .05 **p < .001 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
B 
Std. error  
β 
sr2
(unique) 
 
R2 
 
Adj R2 
 
ΔR2 
Step 1 
Age 
 
.11** 
 
.03 
 
.21 
 
.05 
   
Sex -.05 .12 -.02     
Average hours driven (per week) .04 .02 .13   
.07 
 
.06 
 
 
Step 2 
Communication 
 
.03 
 
.07 
 
.03 
    
Work pressures .03 .05 .04     
Relationships  .05 .05 .07     
Driver training .02 .03 .04     
Management commitment .03 .05 .05     
Safety rules .20* .06 .23 .04  
.20 
 
.17 
 
.13 
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Table 6  
Hierarchical regression analysis for driver error 
*p < .05 
 
 
Variable 
 
B 
Std. error  
β 
sr2
(unique) 
 
R2 
 
Adj R2 
 
ΔR2 
Step 1 
Age 
 
-.02 
 
.02 
 
-.06 
    
Sex -.05 .09 -.03     
Average hours driven (per week) .02 .01 .07   
.01 
 
-.00 
 
 
Step 2 
Communication 
 
-.08 
 
.06 
 
-.14 
    
Work pressures .02 .04 .05     
Relationships  .02 .04 .04     
Driver training .02 .02 .06     
Management commitment .11* .04 .23 .03    
Safety rules .10* .05 .16 .02  
.11 
 
.09 
 
.10 
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Table 7  
Hierarchical regression analysis for pre-trip vehicle maintenance 
*p < .05 **p < .001 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
B 
Std. error  
β 
sr2
(unique) 
 
R2 
 
Adj R2 
 
ΔR2 
Step 1 
Age 
 
.12 
 
.17 
 
.09 
    
Sex -.40 .30 -.07     
Average hours driven (per week) .21** .05 .26 .07  
.10 
 
.09 
 
 
Step 2 
Communication 
 
.51* 
 
.18 
 
.26 
 
.03 
   
Work pressures -.03 .13 -.02     
Relationships  -.04 .12 -.03     
Driver training -.02 .06 -.02     
Management commitment -.04 .12 -.02     
Safety rules .08 .14 .04   
.16 
 
.13 
 
.06 
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Table 8 
Summary of significant safety climate factor predictors 
SC Factor Overall driver 
behavior 
(combined) 
Driver 
distraction 
Traffic 
violations 
Driver  
error 
Pre-trip 
maintenance 
Communication  x  x X 
Work pressures  X    
Relationships      
Driver training  x    
Management commitment  x  X  
Safety rules X x X x  
Note. The strongest individual predictors are shown in bold uppercase. 
 
 
